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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Immovables by Nature Under Article 467 of the
Civil Code
The Louisiana Civil Code classifies immovables into the fol-
lowing categories: (1) immovables by their nature; (2) im-
movables by destination; and (3) immovables by the object to
which they are applied.1 As to the latter, the Code provides that
incorporeal things, consisting only in a right, are classed as im-
movable or movable according to the object to which they apply.2
Immovables by destination are further divided into the two fol-
lowing classes: (1) movables which have been placed upon a
tract of land3 for its service and improvement by one who owns
both the land and the movable; and (2) movables permanently
attached to a building by one who owns both the movable and
the building. From the foregoing it can be seen that there are
three elements which are associated with immovables by desti-
nation: (1) a "unity of ownership" between the movable and
the land or the building; (2) a placing upon the land for the
service and improvement thereof; and (3) a permanent attach-
ment to the building.4
Immovables by their nature are subdivided into three classi-
fications. Land, buildings and other structures, regardless of
whether their foundations are in the soil, compose the first
group.5 Standing crops, standing trees, and the ungathered
fruits of trees are considered as part of the land to which they
are attached and compose the second group of immovables by
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 463 (1870).
2. Id. art. 470.
3. Id. art. 468 was translated to read: "of a tract of land," while the cor-
responding word in the French Civil Code is "fonda," which was used indiscrimi-
nately to designate houses or land. 1 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA ELEMENTAIRE
DE DROIT CIVIL 11 (1937).
4. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 468 (1870). This article provides two methods of
immobilizing by destination. See Bank of White Castle v. Clark, 181 La. 303,
159 So. 409 (1935) ; Morton Trust Co. v. American Salt Co., 149 Fed. 540
(1906); Comment, 5 TuL. L. REV. 90 (1931). In total, however, there are
three elements necessary to immobilize by destination: (1) a "unity of owner-
ship" between the movable and the land or the building; (2) a placing upon
the land for the service and improvement thereof; and (3) a permanent attach-
ment to the building. Under the first method the first and second elements are
necessary. See Bon Air Planting Co. v. Barringer, 142 La. 60, 76 So. 234
(1917) ; Borah and Landen v. O'Neill, 121 La. 733, 46 So. 788 (1908) ; Town-
send v. Payne, 42 La. Ann. 909, 8 So. 626 (1891). Under the second method
of immobilizing under this article the first and third elements are necessary.
See Bank of Lecompte v. Lecompte Cotton Oil Co., 125 La. 833, 51 So. 1010
(1910) ; Petty v. Jones, 10 La. App. 409, 121 So. 372 (1929) ; Day v. Goff, 2
La. App. 75 (1925).
5. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 464 (1870).
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their nature.8 The third class of immovables by their nature is
designated by Article 467 of the Civil Code, which serves as the
basis of this Comment. Prior to 1912 that article simply pro-
vided that water pipes furnishing the house or other estate with
water are part of the tenement to which they are attached.7 At
that time none of the elements associated with immovables by
destination played a part in the classification of immovables by
nature.
However, in 1912 Article 467 was amended so that it now
provides:
"Wire screens, water pipes, gas pipes, sewerage pipes, heat-
ing pipes, radiators, electric wires, electric and gas lighting
fixtures, bathtubs, lavatories, closets, sinks, gasplants, meters
and electric light plants, heating plants and furnaces, when
actually connected with or attached to the building by the
owner, for the use or convenience of the building are immov-
able by their nature." (Emphasis added.)
The purpose of this Comment is to consider the basic distinc-
tions between immovables by their nature and immovables by
destination and to investigate the factors which induced the leg-
islature to introduce those elements formerly associated only
with immovables by destination into Article 467, which deals
with immovables by their nature. Following this, the interpre-
tation of the article by the jurisprudence will be considered.
PURPOSES OF THE AMENDMENT
An evaluation of Article 467 as amended necessitates an un-
derstanding of the theory relating to the distinctions between
immovables by their nature and immovables by destination. Un-
der the provisions of Article 468 there are two means to render
a movable immovable by destination. Under the first method the
mere dedication of the movable to the service and improvement
6. Id. art. 465.
7. The Louisiana courts had no opportunity to apply Article 467 before it
was amended; therefore, a look at the French interpretation of their correspond-
ing article is pertinent. Article 523 of the French Civil Code, which was similar
to Article 467 before the 1912 amendment, is placed between articles referring to
immovables by destination. However, referring to Article 523 of the French Civil
Code, Planiol states: "Conduit pipes are also immovable by nature not by destina-
tion. And this is so, notwithstanding the place which Article 523 assigns them
between Article 522 and Article 524, both of which apply to immovables by
destination. They are part of the house which without them would be incom-
plete." 1 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITIt ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 11 (1937).
See also AMOS & WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAw 87 (1935).
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of the land will suffice, provided the owner of the land also owns
the movable. Movables may also become immobilized by destina-
tion by being permanently attached to a building by one who
owns both the building and the movable. 8 Thus, it may be seen
that all immovables by destination were, at one time, movables.
This is not true of immovables by their nature. All that is neces-
sary to constitute an immovable by nature is that it fall into one
of those classifications outlined in the introduction.
As has already been pointed out, there are three character-
istics associated with immovables by destination: (1) unity of
ownership; (2) permanent attachment; and (3) a placing for
the service and improvement of the land.9 According to the Civil
Code none of these elements were necessarily identified with
immovables by their nature prior to the amendment to Article
467. As amended, that article appears to have borrowed those
characteristics formerly associated only with immovables by
destination in requiring a unity of ownership and an attachment
for the use and convenience of the building. It is felt that the
reasons which induced the legislature to inject each of these
characteristics into Article 467 may be ascertained.
First, it should be pointed out that Article 467 as amended
apparently contemplates only a connection or attachment of a
movable for it to become immobilized by nature, while Article
468 pertaining to immovables by destination requires a perma-
nent attachment. From a policy standpoint, the undesirability
of a literal application of Article 468, requiring a permanent
attachment to immobilize a movable was significantly pointed
up in the 1904 case of McGuigin v. Boyle. 10 In that case a pur-
chaser of a house contended that certain chandeliers and their
brackets became immovable by destination by being attached to
the house. If this argument were accepted, the practical effect
would be that the purchaser acquired the chandeliers when he
purchased the house, and the former owner would have no right
to claim them. This would result from the rule that a sale of an
immovable by nature includes all immovables by destination ap-
pertaining thereto." However, the court held that the chande-
8. See note 4 supra.
9. See note 4 supra.
10. 1 Orl. App. 164 (1904). See also L'Hote v. Fulham, 51 La. Ann. 780,
25 So. 655 (1899).
11. 154 So. 767 (La. App. 1934) ; Bon Air Planting Co. v. Barringer, 142
La. 60, 76 So. 2.34 (1917); Baldwin v. Young, 47 La. Ann. 1466, 17 So. 883
(1895) ; Townsend v. Payne, 42 La. Ann. 909, 8 So. 626 (1890); Succession
of Dougherty, 32 La. Ann. 412 (1880) ; Mackie v. Smith, 5 La. Ann. 717 (1850)
Nimmo v. Allen, 2 La. Ann. 451 (1847).
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Hers did not meet the permanent bond test and therefore were
not immovable and did not pass with the sale of the residence.
Under this permanent bond test, as set out in the Code 12 and
as interpreted by the courts, 13 heaters, lighting fixtures, electric
wires, and other objects generally thought of as part of the house
could be removed after a sale of the residence if the removal
did not break or injure the part of the building to which the
thing was attached and did not damage the movable. It is sug-
gested that policy considerations arising from the application of
the "permanent" bond test led in part to the amendment to Arti-
cle 467, which apparently does not require such a permanent
fixation.
As has already been noted, the amendment to Article 467
also introduced the "unity of ownership" concept into that classi-
fication of things which are immovable by their nature. Appar-
ently this concept was introduced to afford the same protection
to a lessee of a building as that afforded the lessee of land, as
exemplified by the case of Porche v. Bodin.'4 In this case the
purchaser of land argued that the standing crops, although
owned by the lessee, formed part of the land as an immovable
by nature and therefore passed with a sale of the land pursuant
to the foreclosure of a mortgage. Recognizing the consequences
which would follow if this argument were accepted, the court
held that the crops owned by the lessee in no sense formed part
of the land and therefore did not pass in the sale to the pur-
chaser. Although the decision does not appear to be in keeping
with Article 465 which provides, "standing crops . . . are con-
sidered as part of the land to which they are attached," it does
afford desirable protection to a lessee who has produced the
crop. This decision was followed by Act 100 of 190615 which
provides that a lessee's crops are not subject to the debts or
mortgages of the landowner. As amended, Article 467 appears
to achieve the same results as did Act 100 of 1906 insofar as
protection of a lessee of a building is concerned. The require-
ment of "unity of ownership" protects the lessee from the les-
sor's creditors or a purchaser because those things which the
lessee attaches would not meet the requirement. 6
12. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 469 (1870).
13. Scovel v. Shadyside Co., 137 La. 918, 69 So. 745 (1915); L'Hote V.
Fulham, 51 La. Ann. 780, 25 So. 655 (1899); McGuigin v. Boyle, 1 Orl. App.
184 (1904).
14. 28 La. Ann. 761 (1876).
15. La. Acts 1906, No. 100, now LA. R.S. 9:5105 (1950).
16. See Richardson v. Item Co., 172 La 421, 134 So. 380 (1931).
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The third characteristic of immovables by destination in-
cluded in the amendment to Article 467 is that an object, to
become immobilized, must be attached for the use or convenience
of the building. This requirement serves to protect the owner
of the building. Thus, if the owner were to attach a personal
object, such as a family portrait, to the walls of the building,
it would not become an immovable by nature and pass with a
sale of the residence. 17
THE JURISPRUDENCE UNDER ARTICLE 467 AS AMENDED
Article 467 lists numerous items which are immovable by
nature if the other requirements of the article are met. In the
case of Scott v. Brennan,'8 it was held that the maxim "inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius" has no application in construing the
article. After recognizing that the article is illustrative and thus
greatly expanding the scope thereof, the court proceeded in the
case of Day v. Go ff 9 to apply its provisions. Here the court de-
clared that certain items were not immovable under Article 467
or 468 because they were placed not for the service or improve-
ment of the building but rather for the convenience of the par-
ticular business being carried on therein. The same issue arose
again in the case of Kelieher v. Gravois° where the former
owner attempted to remove certain venetian blinds after the sale
of his property. The court held that the blinds were placed in
the building for the convenience of the owner and were thus
movable and could be removed after the sale of the building.21
The requirement under Article 467 that the movable must be
attached for the use and convenience of the building may often
present a close question of fact as it did in the Kelieher case.
However, but for that requirement the owner might lose all
personal items attached to the house such as family portraits,
clocks, cooking stoves, washing machines, and similar items.
The requirement of "unity of ownership" under Article 467
was dealt with in the case of Holicer Gas Co. v. Wilson,22 a 1950
court of appeal decision. Here the owner of land entered into a
17. See Kelieher v. Gravois, 26 So.2d 304 (La. App. 1946).
18. 161 La. 1017, 109 So. 822 (1926).
19. 2 La. App. 75 (1925).
20. 26 So.2d 304 (La. App. 1946).
21. The dissent analogized the blinds to wire screens, saying that if the
screens were not specifically mentioned in the article they too would be movable
under the reasoning of the majority. Id. at 308.
22. 45 So.2d 96 (La. App. 1950).
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lend-lease agreement with the plaintiff. Under this agreement
the plaintiff placed one of its butane gas tanks on the landown-
er's property, it being agreed that the landowner would pur-
chase all gas from the plaintiff. Later the landowner sold the
land to the defendant who claimed that the tank was immovable
by nature under Article 467 and therefore passed under the act
of sale. The plaintiff contended that there was no "unity of own-
ership" and thus the movable could not be immobilized under the
provisions of that article. However, the court held that the
article simply requires that the owner attach the items or that
they be attached on his orders. In other words, the court did
not require a "unity of ownership" between the immovable and
the movable under the provisions of Article 467, but only re-
quired that the owner do the physical attaching or that he have
it done. In 1954 the case of Edwards v. S. & R. Gas Co.28 pre-
sented to the same court the same set of facts as in the Holicer
case. In reversing the Holicer case the court held that in order
for immobilization to take place the owner of the tenement must
have title to the movable which he dedicates to the interest of
the building. The rule of this case was adopted by the legisla-
ture in Act 49 of 1954,24 which provides that all tanks placed on
rural or urban property by one other than the owner of the land
or the storage of liquefied gas or liquefied fertilizer shall remain
movable and shall not be affected by a sale of the land.
The jurisprudence is not clear as to what kind of attachment
or physical bond is required under Article 467. The question
presents itself in cases dealing with the vendor's privilege on
movables. Under Article 3229 an unpaid vendor maintains a
privilege on goods sold. However, this privilege does not sur-
vive if the movable becomes immovable by nature under Article
464, providing that "land, and buildings or other constructions
. . .are immovable by nature. '25 However, the privilege on a
movable is not lost in the case of immobilization by destination
if two conditions are met: (1) the movable has not lost its iden-
23. 73 So.2d 590 (La. App. 1954).
24. La. Acts 1954, No. 49, now LA. R.S. 9:1106 (Supp. 1958).
25. In re Receivership of Augusta Sugar Co., 134 La. 971, 64 So. 870 (1914)
Swoop v. St. Martin, 110 La. 237, 34 So. 426 (1903). In Monroe Automobile
and Supply Co. v. Cole, 6 La. App. 337, 340 (1927), the court stated:. "No
principle of law is more firmly established in our jurisprudence that movables
may, under some circumstances, become part of the realty in connection with
which they were used and become by such use immovable, insofar as the vendor's
right to assert a privilege thereon is concerned, even though such movables are




tity; and (2) the movable can be detached without substantial
injury to either the movable or the immovable to which it is at-
tached.2 6 It would seem that this interpretation is plausible in
the light of Article 469, which provides that the owner is sup-
posed to have attached to his building forever such movables as
are affixed with mortar or plaster so that they cannot be taken
off without being broken, or without injury to the building."
However, the courts seem to apply the same standards when
dealing with Article 467, and have thus held that the vendor will
retain his privilege on a thing which has become an immovable
by nature under Article 467 if he can identify the item and if it
can be removed without injury to it or to the tenement.28 The
door was opened for such an interpretation by the United States
Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, when it declared that the terms
"immovable by nature" and "immovable by destination" are
terms which create fictions of the law and can be considered in-
terchangeable.29 The court thus rationalized that the same rules
apply to both fictions and thus under a long line of jurisprudence
the vendor would retain his privilege if there was no permanent
fixation. This view was later reaffirmed by the same court
stating that the vendor retained his lien notwithstanding the fic-
tion of immobility created by Article 467.80 These two federal
cases were followed by a Louisiana court of appeal decision, hold-
ing that the vendor's privilege is enforceable so long as the mov-
able sold by him can be removed without substantial injury to
the structure to which it is attached.81 None of these cases, hold-
ing that the vendor retained his privilege on an immovable by
nature, referred to earlier cases holding that the vendor lost his
privilege if the movable became immobilized by nature under
Article 464.82
As the jurisprudence now stands there are two rules in re-
26. Caldwell v. Laurel Grove Co., 175 La. 928, 144 So. 718 (1932) ; Succes-
sion of Sdssman, 168 La. 349, 122 So. 62 (1929) ; In re Receivership of Augusta
Sugar Co., 134 La. 971, 64 So. 870 (1914) ; Hamilton Co. v. Medical Arts Bldg.
Co., 17 La. App. 508 (1931) ; Day v. Goff, 2 La. App. 75 (1925). Under the
French jurisprudence a vendor loses his privilege if the movable becomes im-
movable by nature, while he retains his privilege if the movable becomes im-
movable by destination. 1 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT]t ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT
CIVIL 16 (1937).
27. See notes 12 and 13 8upra.
28. Tangipahoa Bank & Trust Co. v. Kent, 70 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1934);
Cottonport Bank v. Dunn, 21 So.2d 525 (La. App. 1945).
29. Tangipahoa Bank & Trust Co. v. Kent, 70 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1934).
30 Smith v. Kent, 79 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1935).
31.':Cottonport Bank v. Dunn, 21 So.2d 525 (La. App. 1945).
-32. See note 28 supra.
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spect to the vendor retaining his privilege on movables which
have become immovable by nature under Articles 464 and 467.1'
If a movable becomes immobilized under the former article the
vendor's privilege is lost. If the immobilization takes place under
Article 467, the vendor's privilege remains on the movable if
there is no permanent attachment so that it can be removed from
the tenement without substantial injury to the structure.3 4 The
writer was unable to find a case which held the contrary of this,
but it is assumed that if a movable were permanently attached
under Article 467 the privilege held by the vendor could not be
exercised.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing discussion the results accomplished by
the amendment to Article 467 may be summarized. First, the
amendment serves to broaden the classification of immovables
by their nature. This result was carried even further by the
jurisprudence when it was held that the items listed in the
amendment are only illustrative. The amendment also affords
protection to an owner who has attached personal items to a
building by requiring that the movable be attached for the use
and convenience of the building rather than for the use and con-
venience of the owner. The third accomplishment of the amend-
ment to Article 467 was to introduce "unity of ownership,"
thereby protecting a lessee who had attached any item to the
property.
The language of Article 467 does not appear to require an
attachment or connection of a permanent nature in order to im-
mobilize a movable. The courts' requirement that there be a
permanent attachment under Article 467 in order to defeat a
vendor's privilege apparently stems from a feeling that the ven-
dor should be protected. It appears, however, that other methods
are available to protect a vendor instead of resorting to a re-
quirement of permanent attachment under Article 467. For ex-
ample, one statute provides that the supplier of movables which
have become immovable by nature still retains a supplier's lien. 5
The chattel mortgage also affords the vendor some measure of
protection. 6 Under either of these provisions the vendor could
,'33. See note 28 supra.
34. See note 28 supra.
.... 35. LA. R.S. 9:14801-4817 (1950), as amended.
36. Id. 9:5351-5365 (1950).
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be protected and the court would not have to require a perma-
nent attachment under Article 467 before holding that the mov-
able became immobilized. These other forms of protection will
be available whether the movable was attached permanently or:
not, whereas it is surmised that if the attachment were perma-
nent the vendor would lose his right under the current interpre-
tation of Article 467.
The policy considerations which prompted the amendment to
Article 467 are not questioned by the writer. However, the
method used to effectuate this policy is disturbing in certain par-
ticulars. The "unity of ownership" concept was peculiar to im-
movables by destination prior to the 1912 amendment. The Lou-
isiana Civil Code was written and enacted as a unified body of
law. This coherence has been disrupted by the amendment to
Article 467 by requiring "unity of ownership" in the classifica-
tion of things as immovable by their nature. It is suggested that
the policy objectives which prompted the amendment could as
easily have been accomplished through an addition to the Revised
Statutes without disrupting the unity of the Civil Code.
Gordon A. Pugh
The Doctor - Patient Privilege in Civil Cases in
Louisiana
Generally all evidence relevant to the issues at trial is ad-
missible, although of course there are many exceptions. The
physician-patient privilege is designed as an exception to this
rule in that it works an exclusion of otherwise admissible evi-
dence. It is designed to encourage the free exchange of infor-
mation between physicians and their patients. The desirability
of the privilege is essentially tested by the balancing of a revela-
tion of truth on the one hand and the encouragement of dis-
closure'to physicians on the other. Although the physician-pa-
tient privilege did not exist at common law,' various states have
adopted it by statute.2 Louisiana has provided for the privilege
1. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (3d ed. 1940) and authorities cited therein;
3 JONES, EVIDENCE § 838 (5th ed. 1958) ; MCCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 101 (1954).
England still does not recognize the privilege.
2. See note 1 8upra. For a detailed compilation of the statutes adopted; see
8 WrGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (3d ed. 1940).
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